Volume 40

Issue 3

Article 12

April 1934

Stare Decisis and the Dead Hand of the Common Law
Trixy M. Peters
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Trixy M. Peters, Stare Decisis and the Dead Hand of the Common Law, 40 W. Va. L. Rev. (1934).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss3/12

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Peters: Stare Decisis and the Dead Hand of the Common Law
STUDENT NOTE
STARE DECISIS AND THE DEAD HAND OF THE
COMMON LAW
Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act. The trial court excluded his wife as a witness
in his behalf upon the ground of incompetency, and upon appeal
the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this ruling.' On certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, limited to the question as
to what law is applicable to the determination of the competency
of the wife of petitioner as a witness, held, reversed: the old common law rule as to the incompetency of the wife as a witness in
her husband's behalf is changed in view of changed conditions.'
The problem confronting the Supreme Court in deciding this
question of the competency of the witness was two-fold.
The
Judiciary Act of 1789,' declaring that the laws of the respective
states should govern the courts of the United States sitting in such
states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise provide, had been held to refer only to
civil cases, and did not apply in the trial of criminal offenses
against the United States.' Thus the Court decided that since
there was no act of Congress prescribing the rule by which the
federal courts would be governed in the admission of testimony
in criminal cases, the Court was bound by the rules of the common law on the point. Having determined this, however, there
remained the main problem of enunciating what that common law
rule was on the question of a wife's competency to testify for her
husband in a criminal case. Therefore Mhr. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the majority of the Court, reviewed all the important precedents of the Supreme Court on analogous points of
evidence still governed by the common law,' and finally arrived
'Funk v. United States, 66 F. (2d) 70 (C.0. A. 4th, 1933).
'Funk v. United States, 54 S. Ct. 212 (1933).
828 U. S. C. A. § 725.
'United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (1851).
rThe court discusses at length the holding and the reasoning in the eases
of: United States v. Reid, supra n. 4; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S.
263, 12 S.Ct. 617 (1892); Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 33 S. Ct.
60 (1892); Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 38 S. Ct. 148 (1918);
Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S.79, 31 S.Ct. 193 (1911); Jin Fuey Moy
v. United States, 254 U. S.189, 41 S. Ct. 98 (1920). It approves the doctrines of the first
four named cases, and says of the last two, Hendrix v.
United States and 3in Fuey Moy v. United States, that they "are out of
harmony with the Rosen and Benson Cases and with the views which we
have here expressed. In respect of the question here under review, both are
now ovverruled." See page 217 of the opinion, supra n. 2.
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at the conclusion that the Supreme Court would declare the
present common law rule to be that the wife's incompetency as a
witness was removed. The process of reasoning was that the reason back of the old common law rule of incompetency no longer
existed, since, generally speaking, statutes have now removed the
party-in-interest disqualification, therefore the rule itself had also
ceased to exist, according to the well-known maxim "cessante
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex."' Further, practically all the state
courts have statutes which specifically abrogate the old common
law rule of the wife's incompetency; therefore the Court asked,
why should it decide the question, when it came before it in an
actual case, in accordance with the "outworn and antiquated rule
of the past'" simply because Congress had thus far failed to act
in respect of the particular matter. Hence Mr. Justice Sutherland quotes as the Court's view in the present case that expressed
by it in the Rosen case fifteen years before: "We conclude that
the dead hand of the common law rule of 1789 should no longer
be applied to such cases as we have here."'
This decision is a very significant one as indicating the modern
liberal trend,' especially in view of the fact that the man who
writes the opinion has always been considered one of the most
conservative members of a court which is definitely becoming increasingly liberal in its decisions. True, Mr. Justice Sutherland
in some parts of the opinion uses the language of the conservative;
0See page 216 of the opinion.
I8 Funk v. United States, supra n. 2, at 215.
Rosen v. United States, supra n.5, at 471.
This "dead hand of the commoh law" which is so aptly phrased in the
Bosen case is the subject of a very pertinent comment by Professor Corbin
in (1918) 27 YALE L. J.668. He says of this statement of the Bosen ease:
"It may be surprising to some to see the common law referred to as a 'dead
hand' and to see it deliberately disregarded by our highest court; but the
fact is that the living hand of the present judge does not write like the dead
hand of the judges of 1789 or 1851." And his approval of the court's
approach is shown by the last paragraph in the comment: "The change and
growth of law by such judicial action can never be avoided. In this respect
it is immaterial to what sort of tribunal the judicial function is delegated.
It may be called a court of law or of equity or of admiralty, a merchants'
court or a board of arbitration. In all alike the judicial function is legislative as well, and with nothing less would we be content."
OThe bases and the scope of this new school of legal thought, the sociological school, which is the exponent of the modem liberal and realistic
trend, are comprehensively discussed in Pound, The Scope and P'urpose of
Sociological Jurisprulenee (1911) 24 HARv. L. Ray. 591, and (1911-1912) 25
HARV.L. REv. 140, 489. Other discussions showing the trend of modern jurisprudence are: Holmes, The Path of the Law (1896) 10 HAav. L. REV. 457;
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 COL. L. REv. 605; Pound, Lafw in
Books and Law in Action (1910) 44 Am. L. REv. 12; Pound, The Ideal Element
in American Judicial Decision (1931) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 136.
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he speaks of the Court as finding the rule of law to have changed
of its own accord rather than openly admitting that the courts
themselves make the law ° But the result of the case is liberal,
and the modern idea is that the importance of a case lies in what
the court in fact does in the case rather than what it says. The
wisdom of reaching this result on this particular question of
evidence rather than in insisting upon clinging to the out-of-date
rule which is "found to serve another generation badly,' m can
hardly be questioned by modern jurists. Some may think, however, that it should have been left to the legislature to accomplish
this result. Nevertheless, the case is but another of the ever-increasing number which reflect the modern trend away from a blind
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis." That trend is in the
direction of subordinating precedent to justice, to the extent at
least of finding Cardozo's "path of safety" between the two chief
objectives of modern jurists, namely, stability and progress.'
This path of safety is to be reached by a court's determining to
adhere to or depart from a precedent in accordance with which
of the two processes will seem to secure the maximum of interests
r. Justice Holmes was willing to make the admission as early as 1917,
in the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221, 37 S. Ct.
524, 531: "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate".
u See Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend (1926) 32 W. VA. L.
Q. 163, 167, quoting from Mr. Justice Wheeler in Dwy v. Connecticut, 89
Conn. 74, 99, 92 AtI. 883, 891 (1915). The whole of the quotation is as follows: "That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of
law which grew up in a remote generation may in the fullness of experience
be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule
when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to
the established and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus
great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and method
of its growth, and in its growth have found its health and life. It is not
and it should not be stationary. Change of this character should not be
left to the Legislature."
, See Hardman, supra n. 11, at 191: "And under this modernization of
law and of the interpretation and application of law, the rigid rule of 8taro
deckis of a generation ago is, in many jurisdictions, changing into a flexible
workable doctrine, thus satisfying a great objective of the modern jurists
by becoming an efficient means 'to make effort more effective in achieving
the purposes of law'."
'BSee CAmDoo, THE GnowTH OF THE LAw, 1 (1924): "How
to reconcile
that tendency [the tendency to subordinate precedent to justice], which is a
growing, and in the main a wholesome one, with the need of uniformity and
certainty, is one of the great problems confronting the lawyers and judges
of our day. We shall have to feel our way here as elsewhere in the law.
Somewhere between worship of the past and exaltation of the present, the
path of safety will be found."
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with a sacrifice of the minimum of interests.' And the determination of this point will depend upon whether the proposed rule
will work better in practice than did the rule previously sanctioned. Thus the new legal approach is chiefly one of pragmatism,
a jurisprudence of results, the first question being, how will a rule
or a decision operate in practice. Hence it seems that this was
the question that the Supreme Court of the United States asked
itself in arriving at its decision in the principal case," with the
consequence that it reached the salutary result of pronouncing the
present rule to be one that would accomplish a more desirable
result in practice than the former out-grown one which Congress
had apparently simply failed to change.
-TRixy M. PETERs.
See Pound, A Theory of Social Interests (1920) 15 PuB. Am. SocIoLoGIcAL
Soc ETY, 16, 28.

See Pound, Mechanicat Jurisprudence,supra n. 9, at 609, 610.
"Funk v. United States, supra n. 2.
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